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 For more than a century, extraterritorial application of United 
States antitrust laws has vexed federal courts. Although the Sherman 
Act—the statutory bedrock of antitrust law—outlaws restraints of 
trade or commerce with foreign nations, courts have traveled a 
circuitous route to determine the precise scope of foreign trade and 
commerce. In one of the earliest Supreme Court cases involving the 
intersection of foreign commerce and the Sherman Act, Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes applied the canon of statutory interpretation known 
as the “presumption against extraterritoriality” to the Sherman Act.
1
 
He concluded that an exclusive link between the laws passed by 
                                                 
 J.D. candidate, May 2013, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology; A.M., in progress, University of Chicago; B.A., 1997, University of 
Virginia. The author would like to thank Amanda Caplan for her tireless support and 
patience. 
1
 American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909) (“The 
foregoing considerations would lead, in case of doubt to a construction of any statute 
as intended to be confined in its operation and effect to the territorial limits over 
which the lawmaker has general and legitimate power.”). 
1
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Congress and the territory of the United States prevented the 
application of the Sherman Act to conduct occurring in foreign 
countries. Less than forty years later, Judge Learned Hand took a 
different approach, holding that the Sherman Act applies to foreign 
conduct that produces an “effect” on commerce in the United States.
2
 
In 1982, after seventy years of courts wrestling with this issue, 
Congress passed the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act 
(“FTAIA”) with the hope of providing a stable guide to the 
extraterritorial reach of the Sherman Act.
3
 Despite the passage of the 
FTAIA, the controversy over applying U.S. law to individuals and 
entities in foreign countries did not subside. Indeed, the FTAIA’s 
cumbersome language posed new problems for the courts. One 
particular issue that arose was whether the law stripped federal courts 
of their subject-matter jurisdiction over certain antitrust claims; or, 
alternatively, whether the law merely added an element to a cause of 
action brought under the Sherman Act, with no effect on a court’s 
jurisdiction. 
This Case Note examines this “jurisdiction/element” divide 
through the lens of Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium Inc., a recent case 
decided by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals sitting en banc during 
the summer of 2012.
4
 In Minn-Chem, the Seventh Circuit sided 
squarely with the interpretation that the FTAIA provides an element of 
an antitrust claim. The court’s holding has particular consequences on 
civil procedure, statutory interpretation, and the extraterritorial 
application of U.S. antitrust laws. The decision also is momentous, in 
part, because it overturns the Seventh Circuit’s 2003 holding in United 
Phosphorus Ltd. v. Angus Chemical Company, where the court held 
that the FTAIA proscribes subject-matter jurisdiction.
5
 The Minn-
Chem decision also adopted a test to determine whether foreign 
                                                 
2
 United States v. Aluminum Co. Of America (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 
1945). 
3
 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2006). 
4
 Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium Inc., 683 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc). 
5
 United Phosphorus Ltd. V. Angus Chemical Company, 322 F.3d 942 (7th Cir. 
2003) (en banc). 
2
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antitrust conduct has a “direct” effect on United States domestic or 
import commerce. Under the Seventh Circuit’s definition, conduct that 
has a “proximate causal nexus” with an effect on United States 
commerce is “direct.” That definition conflicts with the one adopted 
by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals that requires conduct to have an 
“immediate consequence” in order for it to have a “direct” effect.
6
 
This Note argues that the Seventh Circuit made the right decision 
in Minn-Chem. The rationale provided in Judge Diane Wood’s opinion 
goes a long way toward justifying the categorization of the FTAIA as 
an “element-establishing” statute. Among those reasons is the desire to 
establish a bright-line distinction between statutes addressing subject-
matter jurisdiction and statutes regulating conduct. This distinction 
makes the judicial process more efficient because it guides courts and 
litigators on the proper application of the Rules of Civil Procedure. 
This Note also adds to those reasons by focusing on the global context 
of the extraterritorial enforcement of antitrust law. In particular, it 
argues that the Minn-Chem decision’s “direct” effect test adopted by 
the Seventh Circuit effectively serves the purpose of United States 
antitrust laws. 
Part I of this Note introduces the Sherman Antitrust Act and the 
FTAIA, the two statutes at issue in the Minn-Chem decision. Part II 
then traces the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the FTAIA along 
with the “jurisdiction/element” distinction in statutory interpretation 
beginning with Justice Scalia’s dissent in Hartford Fire Insurance Co. 
v. California through the Court’s decision in Morrison v National 
Australia Bank. Part III reviews the Seventh Circuit’s experience with 
the FTAIA in United Phosphorus and in Minn-Chem. Part IV analyzes 
the Minn-Chem decision’s impact on civil procedure, statutory 
interpretation, and extraterritorial antitrust enforcement.  A brief 
conclusion follows. 
 
                                                 
6
 U.S. v. LSL Biotechnologies, 379 F.3d 672, 681 (9th Cir. 2004). 
3
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I. THE STATUTORY FOUNDATION 
 
A. The Sherman Act 
 
The statutory basis for antitrust law in the United States begins 
with the Sherman Act of 1890.
7
 The text of §1 of the Sherman Act 
declares “restraints of trade” brought about through contracts, 
agreements, or conspiracies illegal.
8
 Similarly, § 2 of the Sherman Act 
applies to restraints of trade that arise from monopolistic abuses.
9
 
The law explicitly prohibited acts restraining trade in the course 
of “commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations.”
10
 
However, what Congress meant by “commerce with foreign nations” 
was not entirely clear, even within the first few decades after the law’s 
enactment.
11
 Over the years courts wrestled with that phrase, and, in 
1982, Congress eventually attempted to establish specific parameters 




                                                 
7
 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2006). 
8
 See id. § 1. 
9
 See id. § 2. 
10
 See id. § 1. 
11
 See e.g., American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909) 
(holding that the Sherman Act does not apply to conduct in Costa Rica and Panama); 
but see, U.S. v. Pacific A & R & Nav. Co., 228 U.S. 87 (1913) (holding that the 
Sherman Act applied to a seafaring shipping company operating between the United 
States and Canada); Thomsen v. Cayser, 243 U.S. 66 (1917) (holding that the 
Sherman Act applied because antitrust violation occurred in United States territory 
despite the fact that company alleged to violate the Act was formed in a foreign 
country); U.S. v Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927) (distinguishing American 
Banana on the fact that the Sherman Act applies where a “contract, combination, and 
conspiracy” was entered into in the United States as opposed to acts only occurring 
in foreign countries). 
4
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B. The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982  
 
1. History of the Act 
 
For over ninety years after the passage of the Sherman Act, 
federal courts were left with the task of determining the scope of 
foreign commerce covered by the law. In the late 1970s and early 
1980s, Congress debated and then adopted a statutory definition in the 
Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982.
12
 The House 
Judiciary Committee report on the FTAIA explained that the impetus 
for the legislation was a perception among U.S. business leaders that 
American antitrust laws hindered American export commerce.
13
 The 
Judiciary Committee also found concern among some commentators 
that the legal test used to determine whether American antitrust law 
applied to a foreign transaction was ambiguous, leading to inconsistent 
judicial decisions on what effects on the domestic economy warranted 
U.S. regulation over a foreign transaction.
14
 Although the Judiciary 
Committee heard conflicting testimony regarding these two concerns, 
it nonetheless chose to adopt a law intended to clarify the matter.
15
 
According to the conference report, the standard articulated in the 
statute would remedy the perceived inconsistencies of the legal test 




2. Text of the Act 
 
 The text of the FTAIA is as follows: 
 
Sections 1 to 7 of this title shall not apply to conduct involving 
trade or commerce (other than import trade or import commerce) with 
foreign nations unless— 
                                                 
12
 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2006). 
13
 H.R. Rep. No. 97-686, at 6 (1982). 
14
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(1) such conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably 
foreseeable effect— 
(A) on trade or commerce which is not trade or commerce with 
foreign nations; or 
(B) on export trade or export commerce with foreign nations, of a 
person engaged in such trade or commerce in the United States; and 
(2) such effect gives rise to a claim under the provisions of 
sections 1 to 7 of this title, other than this section. 
If sections 1 to 7 of this title apply to such conduct only because 
of the operation of paragraph 1(B), then sections 1 to 7 of this title 




A bit of translation is in order. The statute begins with a chapeau 
expressing the blanket limitation on the reach of the Sherman Act as 
embodied in the United States Code.
18
 The relevant code sections do 
not apply to conduct affecting trade or commerce with foreign nations, 
markets, consumers, or producers.
19
 The chapeau also includes a 
caveat in the parenthetical that the Sherman Act applies to import trade 
or commerce.
20
 The statute then defines the category of conduct in 
foreign commerce that is subject to the Sherman Act.
21
 If there is 
conduct regulated by the Sherman Act that involves foreign 
commerce, and that conduct has a “direct, substantial, and reasonably 
foreseeable effect” on commerce within the United States, or on export 
commerce from the United States, then the antitrust laws are 
applicable.
22
 In the situations where that conduct causes an injury to 
                                                 
17
 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2006). 
18
 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN 
ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION, § 272i (3d ed. 2006); 
see, e.g., F. Hoffman-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 162 (2004). 
19






 Id.   
6
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export commerce, then the antitrust laws are only applicable to those 




II. EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND JURISDICTION IN FEDERAL COURTS 
 
At the heart of the legal dispute in Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium Inc. 
is whether the FTAIA proscribes a federal court’s jurisdiction over 
extraterritorial applications of antitrust law, or, alternatively, whether 
the statute defines the merits upon which a cause of action may 
succeed.
24
 This section describes the lay-of-the-land regarding recent 
Supreme Court decisions aimed at refining precisely what is meant by 
the legal term “jurisdiction.” The starting point is Justice Scalia’s 
influential dissent in Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California,
25
 the 
first Supreme Court case to discuss the FTAIA. The next case is F. 
Hoffman-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A.,
26
 the only Supreme Court 
case where the FTAIA was directly at issue. Discussion then turns to 
Arbaugh v. Y&H Corporation,
27
 a Title VII sex discrimination case
28
 
that turned on whether certain threshold requirements defining 
“employer” implicated federal subject-matter jurisdiction.
29
 The 
section concludes with Morrison v. National Australia Bank,
30
 which 
dealt with whether § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
31
 
could be applied extraterritorially. 
 




 Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium Inc., 683 F.3d 845, 851 (7th Cir. 2012) (en 
banc). 
25
 Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 800-21 (1993). 
26
 F. Hoffman-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S 155, 155 (2004). 
27
 Arbaugh v. Y&H Corporation, 546 U.S. 500 (2006). 
28
 See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 253-66 
(codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2). 
29
 Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 503. 
30
 Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 130 S.Ct. 2869 (2010). 
31
 Pub. L. 106-554, 48 Stat. 891 (codified as amended in 15 U.S.C. § 78j).  
7
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A. Justice Scalia’s Dissent in Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California 
 
What does “jurisdiction” mean? Justice Thomas provides a simple 
definition: “‘Jurisdiction’ refers to ‘adjudicatory authority.’”
32
 This 
“authority” relates to the persons (personal jurisdiction) who are 
subject to a court’s authority, and the classes of cases (subject-matter 
jurisdiction) a court may decide.
33
 Without adjudicatory authority a 
court lacks the power to decide a case.
34
 Thus, when a federal court 
lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(1)
35
 permits a motion to dismiss a claim for that reason at any 
point during litigation, even after a jury returns a verdict.
36
 This 
description of jurisdiction may be self-evident to anyone familiar with 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedures. But what may be clear in theory 
has become murky in practice because courts have been less than 




                                                 
32
 Reed Elsevier v. Muchnick, 130 S.Ct. 1237, 1243 (2010) (quoting Kontrick 
v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 455 (2004) (Ginsburg, J. dissenting)).  
33
 Reed Elsevier, 130 S.Ct. at 1243.  For the purposes of brevity and simplicity, 
this discussion of adjudicative jurisdiction is necessarily limited to these forms of 
jurisdiction. Other forms of adjudicative jurisdiction, including, but not limited to, 
diversity and supplemental jurisdiction, although important in their own right, are 




 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1).   
36
 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks 
subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”); see also 5B 
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FED. PRAC. & PROC. CIV. § 1350 (3d ed. 2013). 
37
 See, e.g., Howard M. Wasserman, The Demise of “Drive-By Jurisdictional 
Rulings,” 105 NW. U. L. REV. 947 (2011) (“These [four] cases [decided in 2009 and 
2010] continue an almost uninterrupted retreat from the Court’s admittedly 
‘profligate’ and ‘less than meticulous’ use of the word ‘jurisdiction’ and a move 
towards ‘discipline’ in the use of the term.”) (referring to Morrison, 130 S.Ct. at 
2877; United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 130 S.Ct. 1367, 1377-78 (2010); 
Reed Elsevier, 130 S.Ct. at 1241; Union Pacific R. Co. v. Locomotive Eng’rs, 558 
U.S. 67, 71-72 (2009).  
8
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For this discussion on jurisdiction, the pertinent issue in Hartford 
Fire was whether a federal court could decline to hear a case dealing 
with the extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act based on the 
principle of “international comity.”
38
 Under this principle, a United 
States court will abstain from adjudicating a cause of action because, 
among other reasons, foreign law may be better suited to address the 
matter, or an application of United States law might interfere with the 
application of the foreign country’s law.
39
 The petitioners, which 
included London-based reinsurers, argued that British insurance laws 
sufficiently regulated them such that the adjudication of the Sherman 
Act claims in a United States court would create a conflict of laws that 
the principle of international comity was meant to prevent.
40
 Writing 
for the majority, Justice Souter found no conflict between United 
States and British law in the matter before the Court.
41
 Thus, the 
majority held that the principle of international comity did not bar the 
district court from adjudicating the case.
42
 As to whether the FTAIA 
had any effect on the application of the principle of international 
comity, Justice Souter noted that the legislative history indicated that 
the FTAIA did not preclude such an inquiry.
43
 However, this aside on 
the FTAIA was merely dicta.
44
 
The portion of Justice Scalia’s dissent that addresses the 
extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act begins by agreeing with 
the majority that the federal district court had subject-matter 
                                                 
38
 Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 794-99 (1993). 
39
 See, e.g., 44B AM. JUR. 2D International Law § 8 (2007) (“The principle of 
international comity is an abstention doctrine, which at its base involves the 
recognition that there are circumstances in which the application of foreign law may 
be more appropriate than the application of United States law.  Thus, under the 
doctrine of international comity, courts sometimes defer to laws or interests of a 
foreign country and decline to exercise the jurisdiction they otherwise have.”). 
40
 Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 798-99. 
41
 Id. at 799. 
42
 Id.  
43
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jurisdiction over the Sherman Act claims in the case.
45
 However, 
Justice Scalia parted company with the majority’s analysis by finding 
instead that “28 U.S.C.§ 1331 vests district courts with subject-matter 
jurisdiction over cases ‘arising under’ federal statutes.”
46
 Therefore, 
because the Sherman Act is a federal law, the district court could hear 
the Sherman Act claims made by the plaintiffs.
47
 
The bone of contention between the dissent and the majority was 
whether the Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction had anything to do with 
the extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act.
48
 For Justice Scalia, 
the proper investigation for the Court was not whether a court had the 
power to adjudicate, but rather to determine whether, and to what 
extent, Congress extended its power to regulate conduct occurring in 
foreign countries.
49
 The practical implication of this distinction arises 
within the procedure litigants are to follow when addressing the 
FTAIA’s effect on a case.
50
 A defendant in a civil antitrust suit who 
disputes a federal court’s subject-matter jurisdiction over a Sherman 
Act claim must move for dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(1).
51
 Under a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the judge acts as 
a neutral fact finder with discretion to consider facts outside of the 
pleadings pertaining to jurisdiction.
52
 Instead, under Justice Scalia’s 
interpretation, what was once thought to be a “jurisdictional” issue is 
actually an issue of substantive law, requiring a ruling on whether the 
plaintiff has stated a cause of action.
53
 This interpretation requires a 
defendant to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).
54
  For a 12(b)(6) analysis, 
the judge must confine her analysis to the facts contained in the 
                                                 
45
















 Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 813; see also, AREEDA, supra note 18, § 272.1a. 
54
 AREEDA, supra note 18, § 272.1a. 
10
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 Furthermore, the judge must examine the pleadings 
in the light most favorable to the non-movant, the plaintiff.
56
 
Justice Scalia argued that for any federal statute, not just the 
Sherman Act, a court should use canons of statutory construction to 
determine whether Congress’s legislative jurisdiction permits 
extraterritorial application of the law.
57
 The first canon he suggested a 
court should consider is the “presumption against extraterritoriality.”
58
 
Under this canon, a court assumes that legislation passed by Congress 
only applies within the territory of the United States, unless a contrary 
intent appears.
59
 However, despite Justice Scalia’s misgivings, this 
presumption does not apply to the Sherman Act because precedent has 




Second, Justice Scalia suggested that the court interpret a law so 
that it does not conflict with international law.
61
 Within the specific 
area of antitrust law, courts have stated fealty to this principle while 
nonetheless holding that the Sherman Act applies to conduct in foreign 
countries.
62
 It is within this form of statutory analysis—not an analysis 
of the court’s adjudicative authority—that the principle of 
“international comity” should enter into the picture.
63
 To Scalia, the 






 Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 814. 
58
 Id.; see, e.g., American Banana v. United Fruit, 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909). 
59
 Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 814.  
60
 Id. (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S 574, 
582, fn. 6 (1986); Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 
690, 704 (1962); see also United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa), 148 
F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945)). 
61
 Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 815-16 (citing Murray v. Schooner Charming 
Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (quoting EEOC v. Arabian American Oil 
Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 264 (1991)).  
62
 Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 816-17 (citing Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 443). 
63
 Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 817-18 (“Considering comity [as a matter of 
statutory construction] is just part of determining whether the Sherman Act prohibits 
the conduct at issue.”). 
11
Caplan: The FTAIA in Its Proper Place: Merits, Jurisdiction, and Statutor
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2013
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                        Volume 8, Issue 2                         Spring 2013 
 
261 
first question in Hartford Fire, therefore, was not whether a court 
should decline to exercise jurisdiction because the matter may be more 
appropriately adjudicated in a foreign court. Rather, it was whether the 
law enacted by Congress regulated conduct occurring in a foreign 
country.
64
 Once a court concludes that a law does reach extraterritorial 
conduct then an inquiry into international comity may begin. Justice 
Scalia then turned to the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law 
of the United States for guidance on whether international comity 
limits the Sherman Act’s extraterritorial reach.
65
 He concluded that it 
does,
66
 but not without expressing his dismay with the majority’s 
handling of the comity analysis: 
 
It is evident from what I have said that the Court’s comity 
analysis, which proceeds as though the issue is whether the 
courts should ‘decline to exercise . . . jurisdiction,’ . . . rather 
than whether the Sherman Act covers this conduct, is simply 
misdirected. . . . It is not realistic, and also not helpful, to 
pretend that the only really relevant issue in this litigation is 
not before us. In any event, if one erroneously chooses, as the 
Court does, to make adjudicative jurisdiction (or, more 
precisely, abstention) the vehicle for taking account of the 




Justice Scalia’s critique of the varieties of jurisdiction and 
extraterritoriality did not languish. In subsequent cases, the Supreme 
Court went on to use the basic analytical framework in Scalia’s 
Hartford Fire dissent to reconsider how courts determine subject-
                                                 
64
 Id. at 817-18. 
65
 Id. at 818 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF 
THE UNITED STATES § 403 (1987) [hereinafter Restatement (Third)]. 
66
 Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 819. 
67
 Id. at 820.  The term “prescriptive comity” stands for the presumptive 
territorial limitation international law places on laws enacted by Congress. For 
Justice Scalia, the proper focus of the comity analysis is on this form of prescriptive 
comity, not adjudicative comity where a court declines to exercise jurisdiction. 
12
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matter jurisdiction and the extent of Congress’s prescriptive 
jurisdiction to enact laws regulating extraterritorial conduct. 
 
B. Taking the FTAIA Head On: F. Hoffman-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran 
S.A. 
 
For this Note’s narrative arc, Justice Scalia’s dissent in Hartford 
Fire serves as the point of embarkation for the journey to the Seventh 
Circuit’s en banc decision in Minn-Chem v. Agrium. However, the way 
there requires a few more stops at the Supreme Court.
68
 In 2004 the 
Supreme Court directly addressed the relationship between 
prescriptive comity and the FTAIA in F. Hoffmann-LaRoche Ltd. v. 
Empagran S.A.
69
 The case itself has a complicated history and requires 
a brief narrative. The original plaintiffs, both domestic and foreign 
purchasers of vitamin supplements, alleged that foreign and domestic 
manufacturers and distributors had violated the Sherman Act by 
entering into a price-fixing conspiracy that raised prices for consumers 
in the United States and in foreign countries.
70
 The defendant 
companies argued that the FTAIA precluded the district court from 
hearing the case solely as it pertained to foreign plaintiffs because the 
alleged antitrust violation occurred in the course of foreign 
commerce.
71
 The district court agreed with the defendants and 
dismissed that part of the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
72
 
On appeal to the District of Columbia Circuit, the foreign 
plaintiffs, now severed from the domestic plaintiffs, argued that the 
                                                 
68
 See Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416 (1996) (Ginsburg, J. concurring); 
Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83 (1998); Kontrick v. Ryan, 
540 U.S. 443 (2004); Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U.S. 401 (2004); Bowles v. 
Russell, 551 U.S. 205 (2007); Union Pacific R. Co. v. Locomotive Eng’rs, 558 U.S. 
67; Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki 131 S.Ct. 1197 (2011). 
69
 F. Hoffmann-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 158-59 (2004) 
[hereinafter Empagran II]. 
70
 Empagran S.A. v. Hoffman-LaRoche Ltd., 315 F.3d 338, 342 (D.C. Cir. 
2003), rev’d, 542 U.S 155 (2004) [hereinafter Empagran I]. 
71
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language of the FTAIA, specifically the phrase “gives rise to a claim” 
in § 6a(2) of the FTAIA, permitted a federal district court to exercise 
jurisdiction over their claims.
73
 The court agreed with the foreign 
plaintiffs, holding that the act permitted a foreign plaintiff’s claim so 
long as the alleged injurious conduct has “requisite effect on United 
States commerce.”
74
 The court’s holding may be stated in a slightly 
more formulaic way: when a) anticompetitive conduct violates the 
Sherman Act; and b) produces a harmful effect on United States 
commerce; and c) the effect gives rise to a claim; then d) the FTAIA 
does not bar a foreign plaintiff from bringing suit in federal district 
court based on the anticompetitive conduct’s independent effect on 
foreign commerce.
75
 The court argued that this expansive 
interpretation of the FTAIA conformed to the structure of the Act 
itself,
76
 the legislative intent behind the Act,
77
 and the policy goal of 
deterring international price-fixing cartels.
78
 
The Supreme Court reversed.
79
 At the Court, the plaintiffs argued 
that the FTAIA prevented the Sherman Act’s application to United 
States export commerce.
80
 Under their interpretation, the Sherman Act 
still applied to antitrust conduct occurring in either import commerce 
or wholly foreign commerce.
81
 Therefore, because the plaintiffs’ 
claims arose from wholly foreign transactions, the FTAIA did not limit 
the application of the Sherman Act.
82
  
But the FTAIA restriction is not that narrow. Justice Breyer, 
writing for the Court, explained that the FTAIA barred antitrust claims 
                                                 
73
 Id. at 348-49. 
74




 Empagran I, 315 F.3d at 350-52. 
77
 Id. at 352-55. 
78
 Id. at 355-57. 
79
 F. Hoffmann-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A. (Empagran II), 542 U.S. 155, 
175 (2004). 
80
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arising from United States export commerce, as the plaintiffs had 
argued, as well as those claims arising from wholly foreign 
transactions.
83
 This conclusion not only had clear support in the 
legislative history,
84
 but it also conformed to the rule of statutory 
construction requiring the Court to interpret “ambiguous statutes to 
avoid an unreasonable interference with the sovereign authority of 
other nations.”
85
 The Court found that the chief harm potentially 
resulting from the lower court’s interpretation would be an improper 
application of an American law in conflict with considerations 
required by the principle of international comity.
86
 
Whether the FTAIA limited a federal court’s subject-matter 
jurisdiction was not an issue before the Court in Empagran. However, 
the Court recognized that the foreign plaintiffs were attempting to 
expand the reach of American law beyond the limit of Congress’s 
                                                 
83
 Id. at 163. For example, consider an international price-fixing cartel of 
widget manufacturers. The manufacturers are located all over the world except the 
United States. They sell their widgets in every country. The price-fixing conspiracy 
causes an antitrust injury to a widget-purchaser in the United States because the 
conspiracy violates § 1 of the Sherman Act. The transaction occurs in the course of 
U.S. import commerce. The FTAIA, therefore, does not bar a U.S. widget-purchaser 
from bringing an antitrust lawsuit to a federal district court. Now, consider a resident 
of Chile who purchases a widget from a manufacturer participating in the cartel. The 
FTAIA, especially after Empagran II, bars the Chilean purchaser from pursuing an 
antitrust lawsuit in U.S. federal court, either alone or along with the U.S. purchaser, 
because the Chilean purchaser’s injury occurred in wholly-foreign commerce, 
independent of the effect the conspiracy had in the United States. 
84
 Id.  
85
 Id. at 164. 
86
 Id. at 169 (“We conclude that principles of prescriptive comity counsel 
against the Court of Appeals’ interpretation of the FTAIA. Where foreign 
anticompetitive conduct plays a significant role and where foreign injury is 
independent of domestic effects, Congress might have hoped that America’s antitrust 
laws, so fundamental a component of our own economic system, would commend 
themselves to other nations as well. But, if America’s antitrust policies could not win 
their own way in the international marketplace for such ideas, Congress, we must 
assume, would not have tried to impose them, in an act of legal imperialism, through 
legislative fiat.”). 
15
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 Based on this analysis, the Court concluded 
that the FTAIA barred the foreign plaintiffs’ cause of action.
88
 This 
development is notable because Justice Breyer’s form of analysis 
echoed Justice Scalia’s position in his Hartford Fire dissent, which 
argued that statutory interpretation is the proper form of inquiry for an 
extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act.
89
 The Court’s method 
of reasoning in Empagran represented the most significant change in 
the Court’s thinking about the FTAIA after Hartford Fire. In a sense, 
the seeds planted in Justice Scalia’s Hartford Fire dissent had started 
to sprout. 
 
C. Delineating Subject-Matter Jurisdiction and Merits: Arbaugh v. 
Y&H Corporation 
 
In its 2006 decision, Arbaugh v. Y&H Corporation, the Court, in a 
unanimous opinion penned by Justice Ginsburg, adopted a bright line 
test for determining whether a statute grants a federal court subject-
matter jurisdiction.
90
 This decision arose from a sexual harassment suit 
brought under Title VII.
91
 The case went to a jury trial in district court, 
where Arbaugh won and was awarded $40,000 in damages.
92
 Two 
weeks after the trial court entered judgment on the jury verdict, the 
defendant filed a motion to dismiss based on the premise that the court 
lacked subject-matter jurisdiction.
93
 The defendant argued that the 
court’s jurisdiction over the Title VII claim hinged on the statute’s 
definition of “employer.”
94
 For the purpose of the statute, an employer 
is defined as a person engaged in commerce having fifteen or more 
                                                 
87




 Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 817-18; see 
discussion supra Part II. A. 
90
 Arbaugh v. Y&H Corporation, 546 U.S. 500, 515 (2006). 
91
 Id. at 503-04. 
92
 Id. at 504. 
93
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 Under this reading of the statute, Y&H claimed that 
because it had fewer than fifteen employees, the district court had no 
jurisdiction over the Title VII claim. The district court granted the 
defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
96
 
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.
97
 
At the Supreme Court, the issue in Arbaugh was “whether Title 
VII’s employee-numerosity requirement . . . is jurisdictional or simply 
an element of a plaintiff’s claim for relief.”
98
 The consequence of 
classifying the fifteen-employee requirement as jurisdictional would 
require setting aside the judgment entered on the jury verdict for the 
plaintiff.
99
 Alternatively, if the lower courts should have found that the 
requirement concerned the merits of the plaintiff’s case, then the 




The Court held that the fifteen-employee requirement should not 
be construed as jurisdictional.
101
 Under the Court’s analysis, a district 
court’s jurisdiction comes from either constitutional or statutory grants 
of subject-matter jurisdiction.
102
 However, the grant of subject-matter 
jurisdiction does not categorically preclude a “numerical” threshold 
requirement.
103
 For example, the Court found that the “minimum 
amount in controversy” required as a prerequisite for diversity 
jurisdiction
104
 is properly characterized as a jurisdictional matter.
105
 
                                                 
95




 Id. at 509. 
98
 Id.  
99




 Id. at 516. 
102
 Id. at 513. (“The basic statutory grants of federal-court subject-matter 
jurisdiction are contained in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332.  Section 1331 provides for 
‘[f]ederal-question’ jurisdiction, § 1332 for ‘[d]iversity of citizenship’ 
jurisdiction.”); see also, U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
103
 Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 515.  
104
 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006).  
105
 Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 514-15. 
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However, the difference between the minimum amount-in-controversy 
requirement and the fifteen-employee requirement under Title VII was 
their respective locations within the statutes.
106
 On the one hand, the 
amount-in-controversy minimum is within a portion of the United 
States Code that explicitly vests jurisdiction in the federal courts over 
cases involving diversity of citizenship.
107
 On the other hand, the 
fifteen-employee requirement lies in Title VII’s definitions section,
108
 
which is completely separate from the jurisdictional grant in Title 
VII.
109
 Congress could amend Title VII to attach the fifteen-employee 
requirement to the jurisdictional grant, but until that happens the Court 
would hold that the numerical requirement fell squarely within the 
merits of the case.
110
 
After observing that, “this Court and others have been less than 
meticulous” when separating subject-matter jurisdiction from the 
elements of a claim for relief,
111
 Justice Ginsburg went on to state the 
new legal rule: 
  
If the Legislature clearly states that a threshold limitation on a 
statute’s scope shall count as jurisdictional, then courts and 
litigants will be duly instructed and will not be left to wrestle 
with the issue. . . . But when Congress does not rank a 
statutory limitation on coverage as jurisdictional, courts 




This rule is general, in that it does not concern Title VII alone, but 
rather it creates a signal for federal courts on how to interpret 
                                                 
106




 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2006). 
109
 Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 515 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(5) (2006) (“Each 
United States district court and each United States court of a place subject to the 
jurisdiction of the United States shall have jurisdiction of actions brought under this 
subchapter.”). 
110
 Id. at 515. 
111
 Id. at 511. 
112
 Id. at 515-16. 
18
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 For the courts, the rule requires an inquiry into whether a 
jurisdictional grant is expressly stated in a statute’s text. If the court 
finds such language, then the issue impacted by the statute is 
jurisdictional.
114
 Where no jurisdictional language is present, the 
statutory requirements automatically speak to the merits of a claim.
115
 
Meanwhile, for Congress, the rule provides guidance on how to 
write statutes.
116
 When Congress intends for a threshold requirement 
to determine whether a court has subject-matter jurisdiction, then the 
text establishing that requirement should accompany the explicit grant 
of subject-matter jurisdiction.
117
 Otherwise, Arbaugh gives Congress 
notice that courts will construe a statutory requirement as an element 




D. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction, Merits, and Extraterritoriality: 
Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd. 
 
Justice Scalia’s 2010 majority opinion in Morrison v. National 
Australia Bank Ltd. revisits the issues discussed in Hartford Fire, 
except that, instead of the FTAIA, the statutory provision at issue was 
§ 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act.
119
 The plaintiffs, all Australian 
residents, were shareholders of National Australia Bank 
                                                 
113
 See, e.g., Wasserman, supra note 37, at 953. 
114
 Id.  
115
 Id.; compare Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 
90 (1998) (holding that a statute’s explicit reference to “jurisdiction” did not affect 
the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, but rather remained an element of the cause of 
action). 
116
 See Wasserman, supra note 37, at 953. 
117




 Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(j) (2006) (original 
version at ch. 404, Title I, § 10, 48 Stat. 891 (1934)) (amended 2000).  The version 
of the statute codified in 2000 was at issue in Morrison. This section was amended 
again in the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, but that amended version was not at issue in 
this case. 
19
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 They alleged that management executives of the bank 
had made false public statements in reference to a Florida-based 
subsidiary wholly owned by the bank.
121
 National also had other 
contacts with the United States through American Depository Receipts 
(“ADRs”) traded on the New York Stock Exchange.
122
 The plaintiffs 
filed suit against National and its management alleging violations of 
§§ 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act and S.E.C. Rule 
10b-5.
123
 The defendants moved to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(1) and 
12(b)(6).
124
 The district court dismissed the case on the grounds that it 
lacked jurisdiction “because the acts in this country ‘were, at most, a 
link in the chain of an alleged overall securities fraud scheme that 
culminated abroad.’”
125
 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
affirmed on similar grounds.
126
 
Justice Scalia, now writing for the majority, found the same error 
he identified in Hartford Fire in the district and appellate courts’ 
decisions.
127
 Essentially, the lower courts treated a statute that 
regulates conduct as a statute that grants subject-matter jurisdiction to 
the courts.
128
 Subject-matter jurisdiction did not spring from § 10(b). 
Rather, the specific statutory provision that grants subject-matter 
                                                 
120
 Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 130 S.Ct. 2869, 2876 (2010).  
121
 Id.  
122
 Id. at 2875. 
123
 Id. at 2876 (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b) and 78t(a), and 17 CFR § 240.10b-5 
(2009)). 
124
 Morrison, 130 S.Ct. at 2876.  
125
 Id. (quoting In re National Australia Bank Securities Litigation, 2006 WL 




 Id. at 2876-77. 
128
 Id. at 2877 (“But to ask what conduct § 10(b) reaches is to ask what 
conduct § 10(b) prohibits, which is a merits question.  Subject-matter jurisdiction, by 
contrast, ‘refers to a tribunal’s “ ‘power to hear a case.’”) (quoting Union Pacific R. 
Co. v. Locomotive Eng’rs, 558 U.S. 67, 130 (2009), in turn quoting Arbaugh v. 
Y&H Corporation, 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006), in turn quoting United States v. 
Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002)).  
20
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jurisdiction over a § 10(b) claim is 15 U.S.C. § 78aa.
129
 After 
concluding that § 10(b) was not jurisdictional, Scalia then considered 
whether the statute applies to extraterritorial conduct.
130
 
The opinion then follows with a discourse on the presumption 
against extraterritoriality in causes of action arising under § 10(b).
131
 
Justice Scalia noted that, until 1967, the presumption consistently led 
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals to conclude that § 10(b) did not 
apply to stock transactions occurring in a foreign country.
132
   
However, in two decisions - Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook
133
 and 
Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell
134
 - the Second 
Circuit formulated a two-prong test that, if satisfied, permitted 
                                                 
129
 Id. As part of the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress amended § 78aa in response to 
the Court’s decision in Morrison. As it reads, the amendment granted subject-matter 
jurisdiction to United States courts over cases, including those filed by foreign 
plaintiffs, involving extraterritorial conduct that has a foreseeable substantial effect 
in the United States. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act (2010), Pub. L. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1865 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78aa 
(1934)). Although, Congress passed the amendment intending to have § 10(b) apply 
extraterritorially, a literal reading of the statute might not change the subject-matter 
jurisdiction holding in Morrison, which states that the court already had jurisdiction 
over § 10(b) causes of action. Thus the amendment, in what may be a drafting error, 
reiterates the subject-matter jurisdiction holding in Morrison, leaving open the 
possibility that the presumption against extraterritoriality may still apply to § 10(b). 
In short, the possibility remains that courts still have jurisdiction – i.e., power to 
adjudicate – a § 10(b) case, but that does not necessarily imply that the law applies to 
conduct occurring in foreign countries. For a more thorough discussion of this 
peculiar situation, see Richard Painter, Douglas Dunham, & Ellen Quackenbos, 
When Courts and Congress Don’t Say What They Mean: Initial Reactions to 
Morrison v. National Australia National Bank and the Extraterritorial Jurisdiction 
Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act, 20 MINN. J. INT’L. 1, 14-25 (2011).  
130
 Id. at 2877-78.  
131
 Id. at 2877 
132
 Id. (citing Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 268 F.Supp. 385, 392 (1967), in turn 
citing Ferraoli v. Cantor, CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ¶ 91615 (SDNY 1965) and Kook v 
Crang, 182 F.Supp. 388, 390 (S.D.N.Y. 1960)). 
133
 Schoenbaum, 268 F.Supp. at 206-09. 
134
 Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334-37 
(1972). 
21
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extraterritorial application of § 10(b).
135
 Under the Schoenbaum test, a 
court first had to ask whether the alleged violative conduct had a 
“substantial effect” in the United States or upon United States 
citizens.
136
 Leasco solidified the second prong, whether the alleged 
conduct occurred within the United States.
137
 After cataloging a series 
of circuit splits and commentaries critical of this test,
138
 Justice Scalia 
concluded that this test was invalid because courts should interpret 
congressional silence on extraterritoriality as automatically prohibiting 
extraterritorial application.
139
 “Rather than guess anew in each case,” 
wrote Justice Scalia, “we apply the presumption in all cases, 
preserving a stable background against which Congress can legislate 
with predictable effects.”
140
 Thus ended the inquiry into whether § 
10(b) applied extraterritorially. 
The petitioners nonetheless argued that the presumption against 
extraterritoriality did not bar their claim because the deceptive conduct 
at issue occurred in Florida.
141
 This fact was of little consequence to 
the Court, however.  Under Justice Scalia’s interpretation of the 
statute, a violation of § 10(b) requires deceptive conduct “in 
connection” with a purchase or sale of securities within the United 
States.
142
 He grounded this “transactional” test on two premises. First, 
transactions within the United States involving either domestic 
securities or exchanges fall under § 10(b)’s regulatory purview.
143
 
Second, §§ 30(a) and (b) of the Securities Exchange Act regulate 
transactions occurring within the United States involving securities 
registered on foreign exchanges.
144
 These premises fall in line with the 
                                                 
135
 Morrison, 130 S.Ct. at 2879.  
136
 Id.  
137
 Id. (citing SEC v. Berger, 322 F.3d 187, 192-93 (2d Cir. 2003)). 
138
 Id. at 2879-81.  
139




 Id. at 2883-84. 
142
 Id. at 2884.   
143
 Id. at 2884-85. 
144
 Id. at 2885. 
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presumption against extraterritoriality because “the foreign location of 
the transaction . . . establishes (or reflects the presumption of) the 
Act’s inapplicability, absent regulations by the [Securities Exchange] 
Commission.”
145
 The final virtue of this test, and the presumption 
against extraterritoriality, is that it prevents conflicts and interference 




III. JURISDICTION, EXTRATERRITORIALITY, AND ANTITRUST AT THE 
SEVENTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS 
  
Having established the backdrop, the stage is now set for Minn-
Chem v. Agrium. Like the Supreme Court’s march from Hartford Fire 
to Morrison, the Seventh Circuit’s journey began in the muddled 
milieu of what did or did not define a federal court’s subject-matter 
jurisdiction. In United Phosphorus Ltd. v Angus Chemical Company, 
its first decision interpreting the FTAIA, a divided Seventh Circuit 
sitting en banc held that the FTAIA proscribed a district court’s subject 
matter jurisdiction.
147
 However, Judge Wood’s dissent
148
 in that case 
eventually served as the template for the unanimous decision that 
reversed the United Phosphorus holding, Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium 
Inc.
149
 This section tells the story of these two cases. 
 
A. Enter, United Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Angus Chemical Company 
 
 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit first 
encountered the FTAIA in United Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Angus Chemical 
Company.
150
 The plaintiffs were an American firm and two chemical 
manufacturers based in India, all three of whom participated in a joint 
                                                 
145
 Id.  
146
 Id. at 2885-86. 
147
 United Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Angus Chem. Co. (United Phosphorus II), 322 
F.3d 942 (7th Cir. 2003) (en banc), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1003 (2003). 
148
 Id. at 953-65. 
149
 Minn-Chem v. Agrium, 683 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc).  
150
 United Phosphorus II, 322 F.3d at 944.  
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venture to manufacture certain chemicals used in making 
pharmaceuticals for the treatment of tuberculosis.
151
 The defendants 
included: Angus Chemical Company (“Angus”), a Delaware 
Corporation; its wholly-owned German subsidiary, Angus Chemie 
GmbH; and Lupin Laboratories, Ltd., an Indian chemical company.
152
 
The plaintiffs’ complaint alleged that the “[d]efendants attempted to 
monopolize, monopolized, and conspired to monopolize the market for 
those chemicals in violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act.”
153
  
The plaintiffs argued that the § 2 violations occurred in the mid-
1990s as a consequence of prior litigation Angus had initiated in the 
Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, to enjoin the American member 
of the joint venture from misappropriating its trade secrets.
154
 Two 
years into the litigation, when the Circuit Court issued a discovery 
ruling that required Angus to disclose the very trade secrets it had sued 
to protect, Angus voluntarily withdrew its complaint.
155
 According to 
the plaintiffs’ complaint, “but for Angus’s initiation of the Cook 
County Action,” the Indian co-plaintiffs would have sold the 
pharmaceutical chemicals for a profit.
156
  Also, but for Angus’s 
complaint, the American co-plaintiff would have sold the 
manufacturing technology.
157
 In a second amended complaint, the 
Indian plaintiffs argued that the defendants used anti-competitive 
means to restrain them from manufacturing the chemicals.
158
 
The defendants moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of 
subject-matter jurisdiction.
159
 The district court held that the FTAIA 
barred the plaintiffs’ complaint largely because any anticompetitive 
                                                 
151
 United Phosphorus v. Angus Chem. (United Phosphorus I), 131 F.Supp.2d 
1003, 1006-08 (N.D. Ill. 2001).  
152
 Id. at 1006. 
153
 Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 2). 
154










 Id. at 1008. 
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conduct would not have had a “demonstrable effect” on United States 
domestic commerce.
160
 The plaintiffs appealed to the Seventh Circuit, 
echoing the arguments Justice Scalia made in his Hartford Fire 
dissent.
161
 On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the district court erred 
in granting the motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction 
because the FTAIA does not affect jurisdiction, but rather it only adds 




1. The Majority Opinion 
 
Despite an evenly divided court, the Seventh Circuit sitting en 
banc affirmed the lower court’s ruling.
163
 The rationale adopted by the 
majority took direct aim at Justice Scalia’s dissent in Hartford Fire.
164
 
Judge Evans, writing for the majority, drew the inference that the 
FTAIA confers subject-matter jurisdiction from the footnotes in Justice 
Souter’s majority opinion in Hartford Fire.
165
 Because the tendency of 
other circuits had been to classify the FTAIA as “jurisdictional,” the 
majority argued that its interpretation followed the prevailing view.
166
 
                                                 
160
 Id. at 1012 (“It is clear that Plaintiffs cannot carry their burden of showing a 
‘direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect’ on domestic commerce under 
the FTAIA.  A Plaintiffs’ own liability expert agreed, ‘any effect upon United States 
commerce, based on what [he has] seen with respect to AB sales’ would be ‘less 
than substantial.’”). 
161
 United Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Angus Chem. Co. (United Phosphorus II), 322 
F.3d 942, 946 (7th  Cir. 2003) (en banc). 
162
 Id. at 944. 
163
 Id. at 952; see also, e.g., U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir. 
Practitioner’s Handbook for Appeals 141 (2012), http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/ 
rules/handbook.pdf (“Thus, if the court en banc should be equally divided, the 
judgment of the district court and not the judgment of the panel will be affirmed.”). 
164
 United Phosphorus II, 322 F.3d at 947-48.  For discussion on Justice 
Scalia’s dissent in Hartford Fire, see discussion supra Part II.A. 
165
 Id. (citing Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 796 n. 22, 797 n. 24).  
166
 Id. at 950-51. Referring to decisions made by the District of Columbia and 
Fifth Circuit Courts ruling on subject-matter jurisdiction and the FTAIA, Judge 
Evans states, “We simply cannot dismiss these cases as ‘drive-by’ jurisdictional 
rulings.”  
25
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Furthermore, legal commentators, the American Bar Association, and 
the government’s enforcement agencies also supported this 
classification.
167
 The court also found that the FTAIA’s legislative 
history lends itself to the court’s holding that the FTAIA is 
jurisdictional.
168
 Finally, as a matter of policy, because an 
extraterritorial application of United States antitrust law could have 
consequences on the conduct of United States foreign affairs and on 
foreign markets, classifying the FTAIA as jurisdictional permits a 
judge to dismiss a cause of action at an earlier stage than would be 
available were the FTAIA’s statutory requirements treated solely as an 




2. The Dissent 
 
In her dissent, Judge Wood couched the issue of whether the 
FTAIA is jurisdictional or instead lays out an element of the cause of 
action as a question pertaining to whether the FTAIA strips federal 
district courts of their subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 
1331 and 1337.
170
  If the FTAIA’s requirement for “substantial, direct, 
and reasonably foreseeable effect” on United States commerce strips 
the applicability of those statutory sections to the Sherman Act, then 
the FTAIA limits a federal court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.
171
  If, 
however, the FTAIA states an element of a Sherman Act cause of 
action, then subject-matter jurisdiction should not have entered into 




                                                 
167
 Id. at 949. 
168
 Id. at 951-52.  (“The House Report says that satisfying FTAIA would be 
‘the predicate for antitrust jurisdiction.’ It also says, ‘[t]his bill only establishes the 
standards necessary for assertion of United States Antitrust jurisdiction. The 
substantive antitrust issues on the merits of the plaintiffs’ claim would remain 
unchanged.’”) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 97-686 at 11). 
169
 Id. at 952. 
170
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In an argument that foreshadows her en banc opinion in Minn-
Chem, Judge Wood gave four reasons for adopting an “element 
approach” instead of the majority’s interpretation that the FTAIA goes 
to a court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.
173
 First, the text of the FTAIA 
itself does not contain language suggesting that Congress altered the 
jurisdiction of federal courts over antitrust cases.
174
 Although the 
Supreme Court had treated some statutes containing jurisdictional 
language as “non-jurisdictional,”
175
 the Court had never treated a 
statute “phrased in terms of the scope of application of a statute” as 
jurisdictional.
176
 By way of comparison, Judge Wood argued that 
Congress has enacted statutes that explicitly restrict federal court 
jurisdiction.
177
 The FTAIA simply does not bear any textual 
resemblance to those jurisdiction-stripping statutes.
178
 It does not even 
contain the word “jurisdiction.”
179
 
Judge Wood considered this first textual argument enough to 
justify holding that the FTAIA presents an element of a cause of 
action; however, she continued by disputing the majority’s claim that 
Hartford Fire controlled the outcome in United Phosphorus.
180
 Judge 
Wood argued instead that the majority in Hartford Fire in fact found it 
unnecessary to address whether the FTAIA had any effect on the 
                                                 
173
 Id. at 953-54. 
174
 Id. at 954-955.  
175
 Id. at 954; see also, e.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 
U.S. 83, 90-2 (1998). 
176
 United Phosphorus II, 322 F.3d at 954.  
177
 Id. Judge Wood refers to 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a)(2)(B) and 1255, which bar 
judicial review of certain immigration decisions. Section 1252(a)(2)(B), in relevant 
part, states that “notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court shall have 
jurisdiction to review . . . any judgment regarding the granting of relief under” 
section 1255.  
178
 Id. at 955. (“Language like that of the FTAIA, stating that a law does not 
‘apply’ in certain circumstances, cannot be equated to language stating that the 
courts do not have fundamental competence to consider defined categories of 
cases.”). 
179
 See discussion supra Part I. B. 2. 
180
 United Phosphorus II, 322 F.3d at 956. 
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outcome of that case.
181 
In other words, the majority’s reliance on 
Hartford Fire was misplaced because there was no holding on point 
from that case.
182
 Instead, holding that the FTAIA presents an element 
of a cause of action better aligns the FTAIA with the Supreme Court’s 




In Steel Co. the Court underscored the distinction between statutes 
establishing subject-matter jurisdiction and those laying out the 
elements of a cause of action: “the power to adjudicate does not 
depend whether in the final analysis the plaintiff has a valid claim.”
184
 
Without a reference to “jurisdiction” in the FTAIA, the court should 
have concluded, based on the holding in Steel Co., that Congress 
intended to define an element to a cause of action.
185
 Thus the FTAIA 
permits recovery only if the plaintiffs can show the requisite effect in 
their case.
186
 Without showing the effect, the plaintiffs lose the cause 
of action; the “required effect” simply has no effect on jurisdiction.
187
 
The third reason countered the majority’s claim that, for policy 
reasons, it is better to characterize the FTAIA as conferring subject-
matter jurisdiction.
188
 Judge Wood contended that jurisdictional 
inquiries under §§ 1331 and 1332 at the outset of a case normally 
follow a routine review based on the facts alleged in the complaint;
189
 
however, whether there is a “direct, substantial, and reasonably 
foreseeable effect” on United States commerce always requires a more 
thorough inquiry.
190
 An inquiry into subject-matter jurisdiction could 






 Id. at 955. 
184









 Id. at 956. 
189
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turn into a “preliminary trial” just to determine whether the required 
effect is present.
191
 Instead, treating the FTAIA effect test as an 
element of the case permits resolving the issue on the pleadings, on 
summary judgment, or at the appellate level de novo.
192
 Keeping the 
FTAIA within the realm of subject-matter jurisdiction, however, would 
invite abuse from losing parties who would continue to have the 
ability to move for dismissal under 12(b)(1) before, during, and after 
the completion of the case, thus leaving the possibility that the court 




Finally, Judge Wood argued that the history of the application of 
the antitrust laws to persons and conduct outside of the United States 
supports the conclusion that the FTAIA does not affect a district 
court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.
194
 Referring to both American 
Banana Company v. United Fruit Co. and United States v. Aluminum 
Corporation of America (Alcoa), Judge Wood observed that the 
Supreme Court in the former, and the Second Circuit in the latter, 
spoke about extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act in terms of 
whether the law itself extended to parties and conduct abroad.
195
  
Neither court questioned whether it, or the courts below, had 
adjudicatory power over the Sherman Act claims.
196
 Furthermore, the 
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States 
addressed the jurisdictional dilemma presented to the Seventh 
                                                 
191
 Id. Judge Wood provides the twelve-year litigation in Timberlane Lumber 
Co. v. Bank of America N.T., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976) (reversing district court 
dismissal for lack of subject- matter jurisdiction), 574 F.Supp. 1453 (N.D. Cal. 1983) 
(dismissing for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction), aff’d on other grounds, 749 F.2d 
1378 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1032 (1985), as an example of this 
jurisdictional inquiry run amok. 
192
 Id. at 957.  
193
 Id. at 958. 
194
 Id. at 959. 
195
 Id. at 959-61 (citing American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 
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 The Restatement rejects the use of the phrase “subject-
matter jurisdiction” to describe the forms of jurisdiction recognized 
under international law.
198
  Instead, it recognized the concept of 
“prescriptive” jurisdiction as describing the power of the legislature to 




B. Exit United Phosphorus, Chased by Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium Inc. 
 
And so an idea that began in a dissent in Hartford Fire, and then 
returned only to face rejection in United Phosphorus, returned 
triumphant in Minn-Chem. This section concludes the story of the 
litigation that led to the Seventh Circuit’s en banc decision in Minn-
Chem. 
 
1. The Antitrust Case 
 
Potash is a potassium-rich mineral and chemical salt, chiefly 
extracted for use in fertilizer, but also used as an ingredient in 
industrial manufacturing for glass, ceramics, soaps, and animal feed.
200
 
The product is homogenous, meaning that potash supplied by one 
producer is indistinguishable from another producer’s supply.
201
 Thus, 
buyers base purchasing decisions almost entirely on price alone.
202
 
Direct and indirect purchasers of potash in the United States brought 
class action lawsuits in the federal district courts of Minnesota and the 
Northern District of Illinois against domestic and foreign potash 
producers.
203
 At the end of 2008, the lawsuits were combined and 
                                                 
197
 Id. at 961-62. 
198
 Id. at 961 (citing Restatement (Third), supra note 65, § 401, cmt. c). 
199
 Id. (citing Restatement (Third), supra note 65, § 401 cmt. c).  
200






 Id. at 919. The six producers were Potash Corporation of Saskatchewan 
(Canada) Inc. and its U.S. subsidiary Potash Sales (USA), Inc.; Mosaic Company 
and Mosaic Crop Nutrition, a Delaware company headquartered in Minnesota; 
Agrium Inc. and Agrium U.S. Inc., a Canadian corporation and its wholly-owned 
30
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assigned to the Northern District of Illinois.
204
 The plaintiffs’ chief 
allegation was that the producers had engaged in a horizontal price-
fixing conspiracy in violation of the Sherman Act.
205
  
To meet the pleading threshold set by the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly,
206
 the plaintiffs’ 
complaint alleged that these producers formed a price-fixing cartel, 
which, since 2003, had been responsible for a 600% increase in the 
price of potash.
207
 The six firms accused of participating in the 
international cartel were located in Canada, Russia, and Belarus.
208
 
Each firm had affiliates (either wholly-owned subsidiaries or joint-
ventures) operating in the United States.
209
 In 2008, these firms were 
                                                                                                                   
U.S. subsidiary; Uralkali, a Russian joint venture headquartered in Moscow; 
Belaruskali, a Belarusian company, which together with Uralkali owned JSC 
Belarusian Potash Company, which acts as the distributor for Uralkali and 
Belaruskali; Silvinit, a Russian company that sells potash globally and in the United 




 Id. at 919.  The plaintiffs classified as “indirect purchasers” included in 
their complaint four other counts alleging that the defendants violated twenty-one 
state antitrust laws, twenty-three state consumer protection laws, fifty state law 
claims of unjust enrichment, and a restraint of trade claim under New York law. The 
state law claims were not at issue in the Seventh Circuit’s en banc proceedings. 
Furthermore, as a matter of federal antitrust law, the indirect purchasers were not 
entitled to seek damages. See Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium Inc., 683 F.3d 845, 848 
(7th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (citing Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 792 
(1977). 
206
 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007). Twombly 
requires the pleadings in a civil antitrust complaint to allege enough facts to state 
plausible grounds for a cause of action. Mere conclusory statements, without more, 
are not enough to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). In Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal (556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)) the Supreme Court expanded the Twombly 
pleading requirements to all civil actions in federal law. In this Note, Twombly is 
used as shorthand for the pleading requirements established by both cases. See also, 
e.g., 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FED. PRAC. & PROC. CIV. § 1216 (3d ed. 
2013).  
207
 Potash, 667 F.Supp.2d at 915. 
208
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responsible for over 71% of the world’s potash production.
210
 By 
2008, when demand for potash started to decline, prices remained high 
and continued to increase while other fertilizer prices declined.
211
 
Meanwhile, potash supply is relatively easy to manipulate, in part 
because there are no ready, cost-effective substitutes;
212
 purchasers 
tend to buy at the higher price rather than curtail the volume of their 
orders;
213
 production companies have variable costs and have little 
incentive to operate facilities at full capacity;
214
 and entry-barriers into 
the market are high, with new mines requiring an up-front expense of 
approximately $2.5 billion.
215
 In 2008, imports accounted for over 
85% of U.S. potash consumption.
216
 The United States is one of the 
two largest consumers of potash.
217
 
The alleged cartel arose in the early 2000s, after a period of 
significant price depression during the 1990s, when post-Soviet 
producers released a glut of potash onto global markets.
218
 Beginning 
in mid-2003, potash prices began to rise.
219
 According to the plaintiffs’ 
complaint, the conspiracy worked through a series of coordinated 
supply restrictions that the producers blamed for price increases.
220
 
Rather than fix specific prices for the American market, the producers 
raised prices on potash sales to China, India, and Brazil.
221
 The prices 
charged to purchasers in those three countries served as the benchmark 
                                                 
210












 Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium Inc., 683 F.3d 845, 858 (7th Cir. 2012). 
217
 Id. at 849. 
218




 Id. at 916-17. 
221
 Id. at 915. 
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The plaintiffs also pointed to connections between the potash 
producers.
223
 Three of the producers in the western hemisphere were 
co-venturers and equal shareowners of Canpotex, Ltd., a Canadian 
corporation that sold potash throughout the world, except in the United 
States and Canada.
224
 Two potash producers located in the former 
Soviet Union also formed a joint-venture company to consolidate their 
sales and marketing for global sales.
225
 Further coordination among 
the defendants occurred through business meetings and conferences 
where representatives of the producers could meet and discuss future 
price movements.
226
 Under these alleged facts, the plaintiffs accused 
the defendants of violating the Sherman Act, violating various States’ 




2. The District Court Decision and Interlocutory Appeal to the Seventh 
Circuit 
 
In district court, the Defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiffs’ 
complaint based on a variety of facial and procedural challenges.
228
 
The focus in this discussion, however, is on the defendants’ motion to 
dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.  The defendants based 




 Id. at 917-19. 
224








 See Id. at 920-24 (class certification and Article III standing), 928-32 
(Insufficient Service), 941-46 (State antitrust), 946-48 (State consumer protection), 
948-49 (State unjust enrichment). The defendants filed motions to dismiss arguing, 
inter alia, that class certification, under Fed.R.Civ.P. 23, was improper; the Indirect 
Purchasers lacked Article III standing for claims brought under the laws of States 
where no named plaintiff resided; the Russian defendants had insufficient service of 
process (under Rules 12(b)(4) and 12(b)(5)); the plaintiffs failed to adequately plead 
State antitrust, consumer protection, and unjust enrichment claims. 
33
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their motion to dismiss on the premise that the FTAIA excluded the 
foreign price-fixing conspiracy from the court’s subject-matter 
jurisdiction.  According to the motion, the plaintiffs’ complaint failed 
to allege that the foreign antitrust conduct had a “direct, substantial, 
and foreseeable effect” (“direct effect test”) on United States 
commerce.
229
 More specifically, whatever effect the alleged conduct 
had on American commerce was “too attenuated” to be deemed 
“direct.”
230
 The defendants argued that, without this “direct” effect, the 
district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction.
231
  
The district court reviewed the motion under the rubric 
established in United Phosphorus, and held that the FTAIA stripped 
federal courts of subject-matter jurisdiction over foreign antitrust 
conduct.
232
 For the court, the issue turned not on whether there was a 
direct effect, but rather whether the plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged 
facts that showed the antitrust conduct fell under the FTAIA’s import 
commerce exception.
233
 The court concluded that a sufficient “nexus” 
existed between the alleged foreign conspiracy and the fact that the 
defendants “sold and distributed potash throughout the United States” 
so that the plaintiffs’ complaint fell under the import commerce 
exception.
234
 Because the complaint met the import exception, the 
court did not need to take up the direct effect test. Therefore, under the 
“jurisdictional” analysis (as opposed to one on the “merits”), the 




                                                 
229






 Id. at 925. 
233
 Id. at 926. Recall that the FTAIA exception for import commerce means 
that the Sherman Act continues to regulate conduct occurring in import commerce. 
234
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The district court certified its order for immediate review in an 
interlocutory appeal to the Seventh Circuit.
236
 The three-judge panel 
(“Panel”) reversed the lower court’s order, holding that the FTAIA 
barred the complaint because the court lacked subject-matter 
jurisdiction. At this stage of the litigation, the plaintiffs argued that the 
Panel should call United Phosphorus into question and instead subject 
the FTAIA to the rule expressed by the Supreme Court in Arbaugh.
237
 
In response, the defendants gave two arguments as grounds for 
reversal.  First, the FTAIA is distinguishable from Arbaugh because 
the FTAIA’s primary concern is international comity.
238
  The Panel 
found that following this interpretation would put the court’s decision 
in tension with the holding in Morrison.
239
  
Second, the defendants stated that there was no need for the Panel 
to reconcile the holding in United Phosphorus with Arbaugh because 
dismissal was required under both cases .
240
 The Panel agreed.
241
 In its 
analysis, the Panel gave a twofold critique of the lower court’s 
interpretation of the FTAIA.
242
 First, the Panel found that, under the 
district court’s interpretation, the direct effect test becomes 
superfluous.
243
 Under the lower court’s reasoning, any importer of a 
product into the United States who happens also to engage in a price-
fixing conspiracy aimed at a foreign country would be subject to 
antitrust suits in the United States.
244
 The Panel claimed that this 
                                                 
236
 Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium Inc., 657 F.3d 650, 652 (7th Cir. 2011), 
vacated, 683 F.3d. 845 (2012) (en banc) [hereinafter Minn-Chem I]. See 28 U.S.C. § 
1292(b) (2006). A district court judge has the authority to grant a right to 
immediately appeal an order when the judge is of the opinion that the order concerns 
a controlling question of law that is likely to engender a substantial difference of 
opinion. 
237








 Id.  
242
 Id. at 660-63. 
243
 Id. at 660. 
244
 Id. at 660-61. 
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interpretation went beyond Congress’s intent to limit extraterritorial 
applications of antitrust law through the FTAIA.
245
 According to the 
Panel, the better interpretation would not conflate the import exception 
with the direct effect test, but instead it would require the direct effect 
test to apply specifically to the conduct aimed at foreign countries.
246
  
If the foreign-directed conduct created a “direct, substantial, and 
reasonably foreseeable effect” on United States import or interstate 
commerce, then the court would have subject-matter jurisdiction.
247
 
Next the Panel applied a Twombly analysis to the facts alleged by 
the plaintiffs to determine whether the litigation could continue into 
pre-trial discovery.
248
 Although the Panel found that the plaintiffs 
explained the price-fixing conspiracy aimed at China, India, and Brazil 
with sufficient facts, the complaint provided only a conclusory 
statement to connect that conspiracy to any effect in the United 
States.
249
 Furthermore, any connection between the conspiracy aimed 
at foreign countries and import or domestic commerce in the United 
States had to be “direct.”
250
 For this analysis, the Panel referred to 
United States v. LSL Biotechnologies, a Ninth Circuit decision that 
defined an effect as “direct” under the FTAIA if “it follows as an 
immediate consequence of the defendant’s activity.”
251
 If the conduct 
occurs in a foreign country, but there are “uncertain intervening 
                                                 
245
 Id. at 661. 
246
 Id. at 660. 
247
 Id. at 661. 
248
 Id. at 661-63. See supra text accompanying note 206. 
249
 Id. at 662 (“The problem with these generalized allegations is the absence 
of specific factual content to support the asserted proposition that prices in China, 
India, and Brazil serve as a ‘benchmark’ for prices in the United States and that this 
benchmark, if it exists, has a strong relationship with the domestic potash market to 
raise a plausible inference that the defendants’ foreign anticompetitive conduct has a 
‘direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect’ on domestic or import 
commerce.”). 
250
 Id. at 661. 
251
 Id. at 662 (quoting United States v. LSL Biotechnologies, 379 F.3d 672, 
680 (9th Cir. 2004; citing Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 
618 (1992)).  The Ninth Circuit case derives the definition of “direct” from the 
Weltover decision, where the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act was at issue. 
36
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developments” before there is an effect on import or domestic 
commerce, then the effect is not direct.
252
 “Ultimately,” the Panel 
concluded, “the connection asserted in the complaint between the 
alleged cartelized prices of potash overseas and the domestic price of 
potash is too speculative and indirect to state an actionable claim 
under the FTAIA’s direct-effects exception.”
253
 
The Panel vacated the lower court’s ruling based on its Twombly 
analysis.
254
 However, it refused to upset the precedent in United 
Phosphorus, and remained silent on whether the FTAIA affected a 
court’s jurisdiction or established an element of an antitrust claim.
255
 
This decision occurred despite the court’s acknowledgement that the 
Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Animal Science Products, Inc. v. 
China Minmetals Corp. had applied the Arbaugh bright-line test and 
held that the FTAIA only establishes an element of an antitrust 
claim.
256
 The decision to revisit United Phosphorus was left to the 
plaintiffs’ subsequent appeal to the Seventh Circuit sitting en banc. 
 
3. The en banc Decision 
  
The Seventh Circuit’s en banc panel found that the “nascent idea” 
expressed in Judge Wood’s dissent in United Phosphorus had “now 
become a firmly established principle of statutory construction.”
257
 
The series of decisions that led to the bright-line test in Arbaugh 
convinced the en banc panel that the time had come to reconsider its 
holding in United Phosphorus.
258
  The Supreme Court’s decision in 




 Id. at 663. 
254
 Id. at 663-64. 
255
 Id. at 659. 
256
 Id. 659 n.3 (citing Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. China Minmetals Corp., 654 
F.3d 462 (3d Cir. 2011)). In its footnote, the Panel acknowledges that the Third 
Circuit based its decision, in part, on the dissent in United Phosphorus. 
257
 Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium Inc., 683 F.3d 845, 852 (7th Cir. 2012) (en 
banc) [hereinafter Minn-Chem II]. 
258
 Id. (citing Union Pacific R. Co. v. Locomotive Eng’rs, 558 U.S. 67 (2009); 
Arbaugh v. Y&H Corporation, 546 U.S. 500; United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625; 
37
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Morrison presented a compelling factor.
259
 Judge Wood, this time 
writing for the unanimous en banc panel, referred to the Court’s 
finding that “limitations on the extraterritorial reach of a statute 
describe what conduct the law purports to regulate and what lies 
outside its reach.”
260
 By way of analogy, the FTAIA, like § 10(b) of 
the Securities Exchange Act, lacks language in the text of the statute 
that explicitly references a federal court’s jurisdiction.
261
 Therefore, 
under the Arbaugh test, the court should infer that that the statute’s 
provisions regulate the conduct the statute purports to regulate, not the 
ability of the court to adjudicate the matter before it.
262
 Henceforth, in 
the district and appellate courts of the Seventh Circuit, the FTAIA 
establishes an element of an antitrust cause of action.
263
 
With that matter behind it, the en banc panel was left with the task 
of determining whether the plaintiffs’ complaint could survive a 
motion to dismiss.
264
 The first issue for the court was to determine 
precisely what forms of commerce the FTAIA excluded from the reach 
of the Sherman Act. The district court and the three-judge panel 
presented interpretations that did not completely satisfy the en banc 
panel.
265
 However, between the two courts, the interpretation offered 
                                                                                                                   
Reed Elsevier v. Muchnick, 130 S.Ct. 1237, 1243 (2010); Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 
U.S. 443, 455 (2004) (Ginsburg, J. dissenting); Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better 
Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998); Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki 131 
S.Ct. 1197, 1202-03 (2011).). 
259
 Id. at 852 (“We can see no way to distinguish this case from Morrison.”). 
260
 Id.  
261
 Id.  
262
 Id. (“When Congress decides to strip the courts of subject-matter 
jurisdiction in a particular area, it speaks clearly. The FTAIA, however, never comes 
close to using the word ‘jurisdiction’ or any commonly accepted synonym.  Instead, 
it speaks to the ‘conduct’ to which the Sherman Act (or the Federal Trade 




 Id. at 853. 
265
 See discussion supra Part III.B.2. 
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Under the en banc panel’s interpretation, the FTAIA categorizes 
two forms of commerce: foreign and import. If antitrust conduct 
occurs within “import trade or import commerce,” then the Sherman 
Act applies. As a general matter, the Sherman Act does not cover 
antitrust conduct “involving trade or commerce with foreign nations.” 
However, if the antitrust conduct occurring in foreign commerce has a 
“direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect” on import trade 
or commerce, then the Sherman Act does apply to that conduct. All of 
this is in line with Empagran.
267
  
Having established the proper interpretive framework, the en banc 
panel then narrowed its analysis and defined certain terms within the 
FTAIA with more specificity.
268
 First, the court defined a test for the 
kinds of transactions that constitute “pure import commerce.”
269
 Under 
the situation in Minn-Chem, “[t]hose transactions that are directly 
between the plaintiff purchasers and defendant cartel members are the 
import commerce of the United States in this sector.”
270
 This 
conclusion follows logically from the fact that the plaintiff purchasers 
were U.S. entities, and all of the defendant producers were located 
outside of the United States.
271
 
Because the facts in the plaintiffs’ complaint alleged that part of 
the price-fixing conspiracy occurred through transactions specifically 
not occurring with the United States or Canada, the court next 
questioned what constituted “trade or commerce with foreign 
nations.”
272
 The court found this to be self-evident based on the facts 
                                                 
266
 Minn-Chem II, 683 F.3d 853-54. 
267
 Id. at 854; see discussion supra Part II.B.  
268
 Minn-Chem II, 683 F.3d. at 855. 
269






 Id. at 655-56. The court refers to Canpotex, the Canadian marketing and 
sales agent for Agrium, Mosaic, and Potash Corp. of Saskatchewan, and the fact that 
it specifically did not sell to purchasers in the United States and Canada. The court 
presumes that Canpotex was included in the complaint because it was “jointly and 
39
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that alleged the existence of an international cartel that raised prices 
for potash sold directly to U.S. purchasers.
273
 Those sales were 
“plainly” foreign commerce.
274
 The next step was to determine 
whether that foreign commerce had a “direct, substantial, and 




As to whether the cartel’s foreign conduct had a substantial and 
reasonably foreseeable effect on domestic or import commerce, the 
court quickly concluded that the facts alleged by the plaintiffs, if true, 
satisfied those requirements.
276
 What was in dispute, and where the en 
banc panel disagreed with the three-judge panel, was what showing 
must be made to show “direct” effects.
277
 The en banc panel thought 
that the lower court’s reliance on the Ninth Circuit’s “immediate 
consequence” definition, itself derived from an interpretation of the 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, was “misplaced.”
278
 The Antitrust 
Division of the Department of Justice advocated an alternative 
definition for “direct,” meaning instead, “a reasonably proximate 
causal nexus” (“nexus test”).
279
 The court found this definition 
comported with the language of the FTAIA better than “immediate 
consequence” because an immediate effect from foreign commerce 
would likely, if not necessarily, impact import commerce.
280
 Such a 
                                                                                                                   
severally liable” for participating in the conspiracy raising the prices charged by the 
direct sellers to the United States market. 
273
 Id. at 656. 
274








 Id. at 657. 
279
 Id. (citing Makan Delrahim, Drawing the Boundaries of the Sherman Act: 
Recent Developments in the Application of the Antitrust Laws to Foreign Conduct, 
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reading is either redundant or ignores the fact that the FTAIA already 
excludes import commerce from its coverage.
281
  
The nexus test also avoids the concern expressed by the three-
judge panel that any foreign company that has import business in the 
United States would be at risk of violating the Sherman Act simply by 
participating in a foreign joint-selling arrangement, which may or may 
not affect United States import or domestic commerce.
282
 First, as a 
direct participant in United States import commerce, this hypothetical 
foreign company would already have to comply with U.S. law.
283
 
Second, the company’s foreign sales would still need to meet the 
threshold for “effects” on interstate commerce established in the case 
law;
284
 if that threshold is not met, then the foreign company’s conduct 
will not face scrutiny under the Sherman Act.
285
 Finally, if the foreign 
company’s conduct is foreign commerce usually excluded by the 
FTAIA, then that conduct must cause a “direct, substantial, and 
reasonably foreseeable effect” before the Sherman Act applies.
286
 
The court next turned to whether the plaintiffs’ complaint 
plausibly alleged that the defendants’ conduct fell either into the 
category of import commerce, or the category of foreign commerce, 
thus meeting the direct effect test.
287
 On the facts before the court, the 
en banc panel concluded that much of the complaint alleged import 
transactions.
288
  Under Hartford Fire, the Sherman Act applies to those 
transactions if the conduct was meant to produce, and did in fact 
produce, a “substantial” effect on United States domestic 








 Id. (citing Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993); 
Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322 (1991). 
285
 Id. at 857-58. 
286
 Id.  
287
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 The import transactions, according to the court, met 
these requirements, and therefore were subject to the Sherman Act.
290
 
As for the defendants’ conduct alleged to have occurred in foreign 
commerce, the court repeated its finding that the facts presented by the 
plaintiffs sufficiently alleged a substantial and reasonably foreseeable 
effect on domestic or import commerce.
291
 The specific allegations 
that the defendants negotiated production levels among themselves; set 
prices for the Chinese, Indian, and Brazilian markets; and then used 
those cartel-determined prices to serve as a benchmark for prices 
charged to purchasers in the United States were sufficient to meet the 
“direct” effect test.
292
 Judge Wood compared the “benchmark” practice 
allegedly employed by the defendants to the common uses of 
benchmarks like, among other examples, the London Interbank Offer 
Rate (LIBOR) for interest rates in the credit market.
293
 The court 
concluded that the plaintiffs’ complaint plausibly pleaded facts that 
supported the inference that the defendants’ cartel activity was a 






A. Ramifications for the Courts and Attorneys 
 
What perhaps appeared, at the time of the Hartford Fire decision, 
to be a marginal squabble over subject-matter jurisdiction eventually 
inspired a careful reconsideration of how the entire federal judiciary 
evaluates adjudicatory authority. As articulated in Arbaugh, the test 




 Id. at 858-59. (“The inference from these allegations is not just plausible 
but compelling that the cartel meant to, and did in fact, keep prices artificially high 








 Id. (“It is no stretch to say that the foreign supply restrictions, and the 
concomitant price increases forced upon Chinese purchasers, were a direct – that is, 
proximate – cause of the subsequent price increases in the United States.”). 
42
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that determines whether a federal statute grants a court subject-matter 
jurisdiction is formal: does the statute’s text explicitly refer to a court’s 
jurisdiction? After examining the text of the statute at issue, a simple 
“yes” or “no” will suffice. Answer “yes,” and challenges to that 
particular statute will require a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1).  
Answer “no,” and challenges will require a motion to dismiss under 
Rule 12(b)(6), or later a call for summary judgment under Rule 56.
295
 
A federal court contemplating an antitrust claim has an elegant 
method for determining subject-matter jurisdiction through 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331.
296
 This method provides litigators with a clear delineation 
between what defines jurisdiction and what constitutes the elements of 
an antitrust cause of action. Attorneys can work more efficiently 
because this delineation reduces confusion and uncertainty over which 
motions and procedures to follow in a lawsuit. Furthermore, as Judge 
Wood noted in her dissent in United Phosphorus, it reduces the 




As a matter of fairness, the Minn-Chem decision strikes the proper 
balance between plaintiffs and defendants. A district court’s 
determination of whether an antitrust plaintiff’s complaint meets the 
FTAIA’s requirements now requires an inquiry under a 12(b)(6) 
motion. This requirement gives an advantage to plaintiffs because the 
inquiry is limited to the pleadings, and the facts are read in the light 
most favorable to the non-moving party. However, balance occurs at 
                                                 
295
 United Phosphorus Ltd. V. Angus Chemical Company (United Phosphorus 
II), 322 F.3d 942, 959 (7th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (Wood, J. dissenting) (“We should 
not adopt a perverse decision just because parties have chosen to file motions under 
Rule 12(b)(1) instead of 12(b)(6) or Rule 56, or because courts have unquestioningly 
adopted the diction of ‘subject-matter jurisdiction’ without careful examination.”). 
296
See, e.g., JEAN FORD BRENNAN, THE ELEGANT SOLUTION. xi (1967) (“In the 
world of mathematics, when the solution to a problem  exhibits precision, neatness 
and simplicity, it is said to be ‘elegant.’”). Thanks to Kevin McClure, Research 
Librarian, Chicago-Kent College of Law Library, for tracking down the preceding 
definition. In United Phosphorus, Judge Evans recognized a level of “purity” to the 
rationale behind finding jurisdiction through § 1331; see United Phosphorus II, 322 
F.3d at 950. “Elegant,” as defined here, is perhaps a better description. 
297
 United Phosphorus II. 322 F.3d at 957 (Wood, J. dissenting). 
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the appellate level, because review of a trial court’s disposition of a 
motion to dismiss under 12(b)(6), or for summary judgment, is de 
novo.
298
 This procedural distinction is important because an appellate 
court would not have to defer to the district court’s findings of fact.
299
 
Furthermore, the appellate court would be able to raise its own inquiry 
into whether the principle of international comity would have any 
bearing on the case.
300
 Review under Rule 12(b)(1), however, would 
require deference on the part of the appellate court toward the district 
court’s findings of fact, and it would limit the appellate court’s ability 





B. Ramifications on the Principle of International Comity and the 
Presumption Against Extraterritoriality 
  
Filed under the category of “unfinished business” left over from 
Justice Scalia’s dissent in Hartford Fire,
302
 the Seventh Circuit did not 
rule on whether the principle of international comity counseled against 
an extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act in Minn-Chem.
303
 
This avoidance was due, in part, because the defendants did not raise 
the issue on appeal.
304
 However, now that challenges to subject-matter 
jurisdiction are off the table, vis-à-vis the FTAIA, foreign defendants 
would be well advised to argue in their pleadings that a comity 
analysis
305
 limits the Sherman Act’s applicability. 
                                                 
298
 Id. at 963. 
299






 Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 817-18 (1993). 
303




 See, e.g., Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 818-19 (citing Restatement (Third), 
supra note 65, §§ 403(1), 403(2)(a)-(c), 403(2)(g)-(h) (describing the inquiry a court 
should make to determine whether the principle of international comity bars an 
extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act)). 
44
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The presumption against extraterritoriality also received no 
attention from the Seventh Circuit, again because the defendants did 
not raise the issue on appeal.
306
 This omission might signal that, so far 
as the FTAIA and the Sherman Act are concerned, the presumption has 
been thoroughly rebutted by nearly seventy years of extraterritorial 
application of the Sherman Act in federal courts. However, the 
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum
307
 may give pause to those ready to consider the matter 
settled. The issue in Kiobel was whether the 224-year-old Alien Tort 
Statute
308
 (“ATS”) granted federal courts subject-matter jurisdiction 
over tort claims arising from violations of international law committed 
in a foreign country.
309




To determine whether the ATS granted jurisdiction over the 
conduct that had occurred in a foreign country, the Court invoked the 
presumption against extraterritoriality.
311
 This was the first application 
of the presumption to a jurisdictional statute since the Court’s decision 
                                                 
306
 Minn-Chem II, 683 F.3d. at 860. 
307
 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 569 U.S __ at (slip op., at 1) (2013), 
2013 WL 1628935 *1. 
308
 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).  The text of the statute: “The district courts shall 
have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in 
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” N.B.: This Case Note 
substitutes “international law” for the phrase “law of nations”; for the purposes of 
this Note, the terms are interchangeable. 
309
 Kiobel, 569 U.S. __ at (slip op., at 3), 2013 WL 1628935, at *4. The 
plaintiffs, Nigerian-born residents of the United States, alleged that oil companies 
operating in the Niger River delta had aided and abetted the Nigerian Government in 
committing crimes in violation of international law. The plaintiffs alleged that the 
Nigerian government committed these violations of international law: extrajudicial 
killings; crimes against humanity; torture and cruel treatment; arbitrary arrest and 
detention; violations of the rights of life, liberty, security, and association; forced 
exile; and property destruction. Id. at (slip op., at 1), at *3. 
310
 Id. at 569 U.S. __ at (slip op., at 5), at *5 (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 713 (2004)). 
311
 Id. at 569 U.S. __ at (slip op., at 4-6), at *5-*6. 
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 The Court reasoned that the policy concerns justifying 
the application of the canon to a “merits question”
313
 also applied to a 
jurisdictional statute like the ATS.
314
 Armed with the presumption, 
Chief Justice Roberts found that nothing in the text or the historical 
background of the ATS rebutted the presumption.
315
 Because all of the 
relevant conduct took place outside of the United States, the plaintiffs’ 
case could not proceed in federal court.
316
 
The Court nevertheless adopted a legal test that left open the 
possibility that the presumption against extraterritoriality may be 
overcome.  Chief Justice Roberts wrote that: 
 
… even where the claims touch and concern the territory of 
the United States, they must do so with sufficient force to 
displace the presumption against extraterritorial application 
…. Corporations are often present in many countries, and it 
would reach too far to say that mere corporate presence 
suffices.  If Congress were to determine otherwise, a statute 




This test suggests that the prerequisite facts upon which a federal court 
may exercise ATS jurisdiction must show that the torts resulting from 
a violation of international law have some discernible effect upon the 
territory of the United States. The minimum size of that effect is more 
than one arising from corporate presence. Presumably, without 
                                                 
312
 See discussion supra Part II.D. 
313
 Kiobel, 569 U.S. __ at (slip op., at 4-5), 2013 WL 1628935, at *5 (citing 
Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 130 S.Ct. 2869, 2877 (2010)) (“. . . [to] ensure 
that the Judiciary does not erroneously adopt an interpretation of U.S. law that 
carries foreign policy consequences not clearly intended by the political branches.”). 
314
 Id. at 569 U.S. __ at (slip op., at 6), at *6.  
315
 Id. at 569 U.S. __ at (slip op., at 7-12), at *6-*9.  
316
 Id. at 569 U.S. __ at (slip op., at 13-4), at *10.  
317
 Id. at 569 U.S. __ at (slip op., at 14), at *10 (citing Morrison, 130 S.Ct 
2883-8).  
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Congressional action to revise the ATS, future cases will determine the 
sufficient quantum of effect to trigger ATS jurisdiction.
318
 
Another way of looking at the Kiobel test is as an echo of the 
FTAIA. Like the FTAIA, the Kiobel test divides claims into two 
categories. Federal courts have subject-matter jurisdiction over only 
one category: those tort claims arising from a violation of international 
law occurring solely in the United States. The court justifies 
jurisdiction over this first category of claims by citing the history of 
the passage and early application of the ATS.
319
 The second category 
consists of those tort claims arising from a violation of international 
law occurring in a foreign country. For these claims, the ATS does not 
grant subject-matter jurisdiction to federal courts. However, claims 
may be moved from the second category and placed in the first, so 
long as they “touch and concern” the territory of the United States 
with “sufficient force” to justify the assertion of a federal court’s 
jurisdiction. 
The FTAIA and Minn-Chem reenter the discussion here because 
what may be “sufficient force” to knock out the presumption against 
extraterritoriality in the context of the ATS may have consequences on 
whether the presumption still applies to antitrust laws. Although a 
reasonable interpretation of the FTAIA’s direct effect test suggests that 
the test implies “sufficient force,” a Supreme Court wanting to reassert 
the presumption to the FTAIA could make a “sufficient force” 
requirement a separate inquiry, as it did for the ATS in Kiobel. If the 
bar for achieving sufficient force is set high enough, the Supreme 
Court could curtail extraterritorial applications of U.S. antitrust laws 
so that they occur only in the most extraordinary circumstances.  
                                                 
318
 See, e.g., Kiobel, 569 U.S. __ at (slip op., at 1), 2013 WL 1628935, at *11 
(Kennedy, J., concurring).  
319
 Id., 569 U.S. __ at (at slip op., at 8-10), 2013 WL 1628935 at *7. Chief 
Justice Roberts recounts two cases occurring shortly before Congress passed the 
ATS as giving impetus for the passage of the law. Each involved a foreign diplomat 
and violations of “the rights of ambassadors,” one of three areas of “international 
law” recognized in that era. The violations of international law occurred within the 
territory of the United States. Two cases invoked the ATS shortly after it was passed 
and also concerned conduct within United States territory. 
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This possibility may not be completely farfetched, especially in 
light of Justice Scalia’s Hartford Fire dissent. There, he referred to 
EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co. (“Aramco”), where the Court 
found that “boilerplate language” indicating Title VII’s scope over a 
variety of forms of commerce did not overcome the presumption 
against extraterritoriality.
320
 By way of comparison, Scalia wrote: “The 
Sherman Act contains similar ‘boilerplate language,’ [to that contained 
in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964] and if the question [of 
whether the Sherman Act applied extraterritorially] were not governed 
by precedent, it would be worth considering whether that presumption 




CONCLUSION   
 
The Minn-Chem decision provides the counter-argument to 
reapplying the presumption to the Sherman Act. This is, in part, a 
consequence of the Seventh Circuit’s endorsement of the nexus test to 
show direct effect. If the court had adopted the “immediate 
consequence” test, it would have given foreign companies a blueprint 
on how to construct a price-fixing cartel that the Sherman Act could 
not reach. Foreign companies would simply agree to control 
production and fix prices for sales to any country that has no, or at 
most a weak, antitrust enforcement regime; then they could use those 
prices to set the benchmark for prices charged to American customers. 
The nexus test ensures that this method of conspiracy will be subject 
to U.S. antitrust laws. 
Judge Wood also argued, at the close of the Minn-Chem decision, 
that reliance on the countries where the foreign potash producers were 
located to put a stop to the cartel would be misplaced.
322
 Canada, 
                                                 
320
 Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 814 (1993) (citing 
EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 251 (1991)). The 
specific language in Title VII is “any activity, business, or industry in commerce.” 
Scalia compares that language to the Sherman Act’s phrase, “commerce among the 




 Minn-Chem II, 683 F.3d 845, 860 (7th Circ. 2012) (en banc). 
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Russia, and Belarus have no incentive to stop the cartel so long as the 
benefit of extracting monopoly rents from customers outside of their 
countries outweighed any potential losses.
323
 “It is the U.S. authorities 
or private plaintiffs,” she wrote, “who have the incentive—and the 
right—to complain about overcharges paid as a result of the potash 
cartel, and whose interests will be sacrificed if the law is interpreted 
not to permit this kind of case.”
324
 After Minn-Chem, the Sherman Act 
can continue what it was meant to do: protect United States 
consumers, deter anticompetitive conduct, and maintain a free and fair 
market. 
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